I understood sections 19 & 20 as saying:
"looks red" depends on the "concept of red". And "concept of red" depends on standard conditions and practice.
But what I want to be clear on is how he supports the first point, that "looks" depend on "concepts". As this is something that crossed my mind in my own writing (that someone might object "looks don't depend on concepts; therefore your points on public language don't apply").
I think the take-away from sect. 19 is that even seemingly "logically independent" fundamental concepts (apparently "characteristic of the empiricist tradition") really aren't. To repeat a previous comment,
I have found it useful to try to imagine myself in the position of a baby who "knows" almost nothing about anything and has to learn even things that only a few years later will have become so familiar as to seem to have been known all along, ie, to have been "given" just by virtue of being alive and having an intact sensory system.)Eg, to have the concept of a red triangle requires myriad related concepts: the general concepts of "object", "shape", and "color"; the specific concepts of "red", "triangular", and the mating of those; et al. That's the "holism" to which Sellars refers - the idea that concepts function in collections rather than in isolation.
I have to admit that sect. 20, being an imagined dialogue with those of a persuasion I don't quite understand, is somewhat confusing. The take-away for me is that Sellars' reply seems to be that whatever arguments may be mustered based on the ill-defined idea of "sense content", he has managed to (or at least ultimately will) develop a coherent argument with no reference to any such imagined entity. Which may explain why - as I noted in an earlier comment - he avoids what seems an obvious move, viz, to replace "sense content" with some idea of "neural state". It appears that he wants to make his argument as general as possible, in particular not to depend on reduction to any specific physiological underpinnings.
If one didn't have that objective, it seems to me that the resolution to the question of what is consistent among the three situations listed on p. 144 in the sect. 17 study guide is that all three could conceivably be associated with the same neural state. But the context for each situation could be different in that each could include a different collection of other relevant concepts, supporting information, etc. And that difference in context for the same neural state could explain the different levels of endorsement that define the three distinct situations.
13 comments:
Hey Charles. Finished with EatPoM. Fantastic read. If you have anything you want to talk about feel free ;)
Welcome back, Mike!
In case you haven't already, check out "ron murp"'s comments on the latest CE thread on Chalmers (right before the current "octopus" thread). He appears to be "one of us"!
I'm now reading Knowledge, Mind, and the Given" by deVries and Triplett, another EPM study guide (200 pages in addition to the whole EPM essay) - wish I'd had it for my first pass. It gives background, explanations, critiques, etc, in much more detail than Brandom's. I'm just up to its treatment of EPM sections in the early 20's, most of which I think I more or less got before. But as I get into the later ones, I'll probably want to compare notes.
Glad that after all my hype you weren't disappointed with the essay.
I added KMatG to my list of books to order next. Thanks for that suggestion.
I have a hard time getting a bearing on his "inner episodes" still. At times they sound feasible, e.g. sections 51&52.
But then in section 61 he starts talking about "inner replicas" and i find myself going "?!"
At times he also seems to be in support of "mentalese/a language of thought", and for "streams" of mental content.
He also thinks qualia (experience) and 'intentional objects' (beliefs) are two distinct kinds of mental content; whereas Descrates held them as one. I tend to side with Descarte on that point (I think).
However, these missteps don't tarnish how strong his argument is for overturning the Cartesian epistemic model.
I'd suggest you read Dennett's "Content and Consciousness". It picks up where Sellars leaves off I think; by actually writing about neurology and computer science. But more importantly perhaps, you'll see 'psychological nominalism' bloom into a more developed theory in what is Dennetts version of it: 'awareness1 and awareness2'. Also see Con.Explain p.196 where Dennett takes Sellars's points on private talk being based off of public talk and supporting them with an argument with teeth (the evolution of autostimulation).
I have a stack of notes from reading Quine's WaO that tie into Psych.Nom. as well. If you'd like I can toss the esoteric stack of them up on here.
Part I
===============
Still immersed in Thanksgiving activities, but thought I'd at least knock off a quickie response.
Your last comment motivated me to pick up the pace on reading KMG, I'm now into the final and crucial ten or so sections. That book is indispensable in dealing with EPM - sure wish I had gotten it earlier. Since a lot of the really good stuff is in the sections still unread, I can only make a partial reply.
One thing the KMG authors emphasize is that (as seems unfortunately de rigueur in phil of mind) Sellars inexplicably changes vocabulary as the essay progresses. An especially egregious instance is the introduction in section 22 of the "residue" left over after accounting for the common propositional content and different levels of endorsement in the experiences:
- seeing that a red triangle is over there
- it's looking as if the object over there is a red triangle
- it's looking as if there is a red triangle over there
That entity - which as best I can tell is what we call "qualia" - is called in section 22 the common "descriptive content" of the three experiences but in the critical final sections of the essay is renamed "sense impressions". Considering that a major part of the first half of the essay is to discount much of the idea of "sense data", that seems like an especially unfortunate choice of words.
In any event, the "sense impression" part of the essay is what motivated me to be such a pain in the butt on CE about EPM - it seems to be an approach to dealing with those elusive "qualia". KMG points out several problems with the approach, but it remains at a minimum suggestive of the feasibility of a scientific (3-POV, which vicente now claims doesn't even exist!) attack on qualia.
An aside: The rather hostile dismissal of this suggestion by some commenters on CE initiated my partial disengagement with a couple of CE denizens; a recent bizarre exchange on the thread referenced in my comment above motivated further - possibly complete - disengagement. Some there have what I can only describe as a religious commitment to their position that seems to preclude rational discourse.
Part II
======================
I think what Sellars means by "inner episodes" is in general what I hesitatingly call the "conscious" events in the mental realm, especially thoughts (Part XV) and Impressions (AKA, phenomenal experiences or qualia) (Part XVI). I haven't made it to the KMG discussion of the final sections yet, but I vaguely recall having the same reaction to "replicas" that you describe, but I think I decided that it was yet another unfortunate choice of label for something in the model that is not a representation, replica, copy, etc., but instead seems to me to be a generalization of the specific idea of what I call "neural correlates" in this comment:
http://www.consciousentities.com/?p=640#comment-163593
At least that is what I envision as being the common neurophysiological aspect of the three experiences above, from which the phenomenal experience - necessarily also common - arises. (The only trick is explaining hallucinations - the third experience - which I envision as a product of some kind of feedback from later stage visual processing to an early stage, in which what is fed back is essentially a kind of noise (possibly caused by brain malfunction) that just happens to result in NCs that are the same as those resulting from stimulation by light from a red triangle. (See:
http://onthehuman.org/2010/11/does-consciousness-outstrip-sensation/comment-page-1/#comment-3421
for a take on this general idea from an authority with just a tad more credibility than yours truly.)
On qualia and intentional objects, you'll have to explain why you think Sellars considers them different "kinds of mental content". As far as I've gotten on my (indirect via KMG) reread of EPM, the only role I'm aware of for intentionality is as a common feature of the "intentional idiom" and thoughts - they are both "about" things - which suggests the possibility of modeling the latter on the former as Sellars does. (Probably not quite a coherent statement, but the best I can do until I finish the sections I'm now on.)
Next on my agenda is to check out your refs to Dennett. Altho I recall no details from my read of Consc Explained a while back, I've been assuming that his heterophenomenology was more or less what I think you're suggesting, viz,, Sellars' lean approach "beefed up" with some neurophysiology and AI.
Well, this turned out to be much more than partial - that's about all I have to say so far. Over and out.
Hi Charles, finally checked back in to here =)
I've been busy reading Sellars' "Some reflections on language games". Rather difficult essay, but very interesting; I highly recommend it. What, I think, is most notable about it is his use of natural selection to show how its possible to move from non-linguistic games to language games. It's very reminiscent of Dennett's "Intentional Stance", and must of been an impetus for him.
Also, Deutscher has a new book "Through the Language Glass" you would find interesting. It's somewhat watered down, but he gives a good case for what you and I have been advocating: language both effects experience and is part of it.
I too more or less "checked out" on CE, Vincent and Karlee...for now. The discussion became to capricious, in the sense that they moved the desiderata in and out of the scientific domain as they pleased. I frankly, as an Martian would, have no idea what they are going on about, and they seem incapable of pointing out to me what it is either; the habit of using empty nouns.
Anyhow, back to Sellars... we've both tossed up a lot of points he's made. My head is sorta spinning now heh. I'm gonna stick to two for now I guess. 1) NCCs/Sellarian-"inner episodes" and 2) if qualia and intentional-objects are the same sort of mental content.
"3. A “phenomenal experience” (a mental visual image, possibly with an emotional component, that accompanies NC(V,red). Call it PE(V,red).
4. An epistemological aspect, viz, V’s ability to “know” that red is being seen, ie, to respond to NC(V,red) with the statement “I am seeing red”.
It is important to note that 3 and 4 are distinct. "
I just wanted to point out that Sellars' "psychological nominalism" advocates 3 and 4 are coextensive. As he feels that to 'know that you are experiencing red' is to put oneself in the 'game of reasons' and this is a linguistic and public affair. Therefore, if we follow Sellars (and I think we should) we CAN have 3 without 4, BUT such experience is pre-linguistic awareness AND this is not the sort of awareness we normally associate with consciousness but with amoeba.
"There is no such thing, accordingly, as preconceptual awareness or prelinguistic awareness "
I, as I alluded to above, wouldn't go this far. Unlike Sellars I'm willing to admit there is a form of awareness that is non-linguistic, BUT such is really not "awareness" in any sense of how that word is normally used and predicated. But his point still stands against the likes of those (e.g. Vincent and KL) that think they can speak of "awareness", in the normal sense of the word, without acknowledging that it is anchored to public, objective, reality in the harshest of ways.
Also, one more scatter-brained point. Sellars (1954) "Language games" talks about "language entry transitions", where one is going from pattern recognition behavior (I'm willing to call this pre-linguistic awareness) as found with bee's, into object language "x is red" and meta-language "x is 'red'".
These transitions from what Sellars calls "the world of fact", and Dennett calls "the physical stance", into languages games involving the language of folk-psychology (Dennett's "intentional stance"), is the crux of the matter. As I mentioned on CE, to figure this matter out is to break the cycle of explaining the terms of psych in more terms of psych! And to provide the likes of Vincent/KL a sketch of how experience can be explained without having to rewrite physics books.
I dunno why, but a post keeps getting deleted.
Find the "What then is required for knowledge of our own inner, " paragraph at http://www.iep.utm.edu/sellars/
Further ramblings:
I'm very skeptical of the whole NCC program of research; e.g. Crick and Koch. For reasons given elsewhere, I think the ontology of 'redness' is far to distributed and diffused (Sellars tells us part of it is public language!) for the program to ever show 'state X of neurology is coextensive with experience R'.
That being said... I'm pondering a few thoughts. The neo-cortex is outgrowth of the older brain stem areas. I think we should expect to say with some degree of assurance that the old brain area are more 'integrative'; being older areas their roll should have evolved into more of a 'busing' function. E.g. the 'higher brain stem'. Even older areas, e.g. the 'lower brain stem', being key to piping signals out to , and in from, the body, should be pressured into simpler relaying and repeating functionality.
If Sellars is right about language and experience, I'm expecting linguistic areas, e.g. Broca and Wernicke areas, to be associated with signs of typical conscious 'awareness'. And the controversy and difficulty will be in how we differentiate between linguistic awareness and non-linguistic awareness that pleases our intuitions and sense of humanity (a good deal of what we do, e.g. typing, passes us by with only vague hints of our 'awareness').
But that's a naive hunch of mine.
Mike -
Sounds like you've been busy. Some quickie replies:
Re my distinction between phenomenal experience (PE), item 3 in my list, and what I called the "epistemological aspect", item 4.
As usual, the language in this arena just isn't sufficiently well-established for even we who are trying to be careful in our choice of words to avoid confusion. I assume that what I call PE is what you mean by "prelinguistic awareness", ie, no cognitive aspect. However, I probably wouldn't call it "prelinguistic" since that can be interpreted as meaning "before one learns to speak a language". What I have in mind is the presumed position of Mary at time T, after she leaves her room and encounters a color that others call "red" but before she triangulates and learns to associate the new PE with the word "red". At time T she is clearly not prelingual in any sense other than the inability to make that association. And I agree that "awareness" is a problematic term. So, a better term might be either "non-cognitive PE" or "non-epistemic PE".
On the other hand, I have been wondering if even having such (non-cognitive) PEs must also be learned, contrary to the assumption - implicit in most discussions - that the ability to have PEs is "given". In particular, do babies "see red" even before they learn a language and learn to associate a specific PE with the word "red"? I can't really say why, but I have a sense that if not, it would significantly alter the dialog about, for example, "what it's like to see red", since something seems to me less mysterious/subjective/ineffable if learned than if "given".
I don't know why one of your comments disappeared. The blogger system seems to have rather limited management tools - or perhaps I just don't know how to use them.
"pattern recognition behavior (I'm willing to call this pre-linguistic awareness)"
The term I like and assume corresponds to this idea - presumably derived from Ryles' "dispositions" - is "reliable differential responsive disposition". A bit of a mouthful (until acronymed into the easily remembered RD-squared), but it pretty well captures the major features of the idea.
In any event, I still don't understand why it seems necessary to "explain[] the terms of psych in more terms of psych". Assuming that one accepts Sellars' (and I think Davidson's) suggestion that the meaning of a word is its function in a vocabulary, so long as a word is being used successfully within the psych community, why is it necessary to explain it at all, at least within that community? (If it is deemed necessary to explain it outside that community, presumably it will have to be by using analogies to non-psychological concepts described in a non-psychological vocabulary.)
I too am skeptical of trying to explain these issues solely in terms of NCCs. I have recently been reading papers by Kevin O'Regan describing his (and at one time Noe's) "sensorimotor approach" which is based on actions rather that neural states. (See http://nivea.psycho.univ-paris5.fr/Manuscripts/PBR_50005_reducedsize.pdf.) I have been thinking along similar lines (although at a very primitive level and narrowly focused on linguistic actions), so I find the approach interesting, at least to the limited extent I currently understand it. If you finish off the 100 other things on your must-read list, give it a try.
And in the reading overload vein, although I'm not sure when I'll get to it, if you want to provide me with the Quine notes to which you alluded before, pass them along. (e-mail: ctwiii@yahoo.com)
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