tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8817626.post6236240645847807366..comments2014-06-15T13:37:05.828-04:00Comments on Secular Logic: On colorCharles T. Wolvertonhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/12309746685166449683noreply@blogger.comBlogger2125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8817626.post-55472980250488365652012-02-13T22:32:26.506-05:002012-02-13T22:32:26.506-05:00Yes, different SPDs (spectral power distributions)...Yes, different SPDs (spectral power distributions) can cause the same phenomenal experience, due to the phenomenon of metamerism I think. But what I mean by "close" in the case of my hypothesized neural matched filter is simply that there will be SPDs that don't result in exactly the same NAP that was produced by the training process but will still be "close enough" to trigger the acquired dispositional response (<b>red</b>, for example). A real matched filter can be analyzed mathematically, and "close to the signal to which the filter is matched" can be given a precise meaning. But that level of detail isn't relevant to my present purpose which is just to imagine generally how the process I envision might handle problematic issues.Charles T. Wolvertonhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12309746685166449683noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8817626.post-21749234178959758532012-02-13T16:48:45.688-05:002012-02-13T16:48:45.688-05:00Phenomenal qualities may match although they diffe...Phenomenal qualities may match although they differ in SPD, assuming 'SPD' has the meaning I think it does. This, also, has implications for your use of 'close'.<br /><br />Notice that this is a comparative term. The logic of these terms, especially in the context of discussion of 'qualia' is special. I've addressed some of these issues at http://www.hist-analytic.com/COVERINGCONCEPTS.htm<br /><br />One aspect of 'close', semantically, is that a logical analysis of the concept suggests that 'closer' is more fundamental. Owing to the fact that matching phenomenal qualities may differ in SPD and 'distance' from other qualia, the idea of 'close' needs some further spelling out. <br /><br />From the philosophers point of view, 'surface' is a very complex notion. We can fiddle with descriptions out of elementary point set topology such as 'boundary' but this will not, alone, suffice to achieve the sort of clarity required for the purpose; or so it seems to me.<br /><br />Much of what I've said about 'close' will ramify throughout any careful analysis of 'matched filter'. What is the relation of matching to closeness. Coincidence of SPD may not suffice for matching, depending on what we mean by closeness. In other words, we need to consider the relation of closeness and matching in both the phenomenal and nonphenomenal cases.<br /><br />Finally, a quale or occurrence at a time and place of a quale and the occurrence of a physical property, on the phenomenalist model, will be be different conceptually. If a quale is a sense-datum in the traditional sense (I don't buy this; Putnam does) it is not repeatable. A property we may associate with the quale may be repeatable; but hat is different. Particulars are not repeatable; they may be re-identifiable (cf. Strawson on sounds in Individuals, Anchor Books, 1959) but universals not particulars are repeatable.Steven R. Baynehttp://www.hist-analytic.comnoreply@blogger.com